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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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23 MAY 1973


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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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


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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 14 - 21 MAY 1973

Moscow (2672 items)

Brezhnev in FRG	(1%)	25%
Brezhnev in Poland, GDR	(13%)	12%
Vietnam	(1%)	4%
China	(2%)	4%
Brezhnev Upcoming U.S. Visit	(2%)	2%

Peking (1166 items)

Domestic Issues	(49%)	44%
Indochina	(16%)	14%
[Sihanouk Tour of Africa, Europe	(9%)	10%]
PRC Friendship Delegation in Japan	(3%)	6%
Sri Lanka late Premier Bandaranaike Anniversary	(--)	5%
Danish Foreign Minister in PRC	(--)	5%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Consistent with past treatment of private U.S.-DRV talks, Vietnamese communist media have virtually ignored the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho meetings which began in Paris on 17 May. However, the hardline posture assumed by Tho in his arrival statement on the 14th was bolstered by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's warnings that alleged U.S. air intrusions over the North could adversely affect the meetings. Hanoi also complained that President Nixon in his Armed Forces Day address on the 19th continued to play the role of defender of the Vietnam peace agreement while slandering and threatening North Vietnam. Available Hanoi comment did not acknowledge the President's remarks about U.S.-Soviet relations, although the DRV press has noted Brezhnev's upcoming visit to the United States. Continuing wide publicity for developments in the Watergate case cites Western press speculation regarding its impact on U.S. policy in general and on the President and Kissinger specifically.

Moscow has continued its low-keyed attention to Vietnam. In reporting the President's Armed Forces Day address TASS omitted all of his references to Indochina. And Brezhnev in his 21 May speech over West German television remarked that "mankind's horizons are, after all, growing brighter. The war in Vietnam has ended." Podgornyy speaking on the same day in Afghanistan did observe that "military operations are still going on in Indochina and the situation there remains complex," but he expressed confidence that the "current problems" there will be solved.

During his African tour Sihanouk has been stressing that the Cambodian question can only be settled by his government and is not a subject for the Kissinger-Tho talks. A 12 May RGNU Foreign Ministry protest against U.S. bombing in Cambodia was seconded on the same level by the DRV and the PRG, but the Chinese, sustaining their low posture on Indochinese developments, have not responded.

DRV SCORES NIXON SPEECH, SAYS FLIGHTS WILL AFFECT PARIS TALKS

Hanoi radio and VNA accounts of a 21 May NHAN DAN article on the President's Armed Forces Day speech ignored his specific charges of DRV violations of the peace accord, but they repeated Hanoi's catalog of complaints regarding U.S. alleged violations, including

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the charge of reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam. The issue of reconnaissance flights was raised officially most recently in DRV Foreign Ministry statements on the 20th and 21st. Both warned that the intrusions "have a negative effect" on the current round of talks between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, and the statement on the 20th maintained that the alleged flights, coming in the midst of the U.S.-DRV meetings, have "given the lie to U.S. professions of good faith." Vietnamese communist media have not reported on the current U.S.-DRV talks in Paris, but they have followed their practice during similar private meetings last fall of noting that Le Duc Tho had met with PRG officials in Paris to inform them of his meetings with Kissinger.

The current statements follow the pattern of previous protests against alleged U.S. reconnaissance flights--five statements between 15 March and 12 May--in claiming that the actions violate Article 2 of the peace accord pledging an end to U.S. military activities against the DRV. The statement of 20 May for the first time explicitly claimed the existence of a U.S. commitment to stop all reconnaissance flights over DRV territory. The first two foreign ministry spokesman's protests over such flights, on 15 and 31 March, did not mention any such commitment, but a Hanoi radio commentary on 15 March implied that there was a private understanding when it flatly asserted that the peace accord's provision for an end to U.S. military activity against the DRV included an end to reconnaissance. The first reference to an unspecified U.S. commitment appeared in an official protest on 20 April, when the foreign ministry spokesman accused the United States of conducting reconnaissance flights throughout the DRV. Similar references to a U.S. commitment appeared in spokesman's statements on 26 April--when widespread reconnaissance was again charged--and on 12 May--when intrusions over the southernmost province of Quang Binh were claimed. The current protests only charged the United States with intrusions in coastal areas--over Nghe An and Thanh Hoa on the 18th and Nam Ha and Thai Binh on the 20th.

The 21 May NHAN DAN article on the President's speech critically noted his statement that the United States was continuing to take necessary measures to insure that all parties to the agreement keep their word and live up to their obligations. The paper commented that the President was on the defensive and that his statements were "self-justifications, aimed first at pleading for the continued bombing of Cambodia in defiance" of congressional protests. It noted in this regard his remark that

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everyone at home and abroad should understand that U.S. policy is not aimed at continuing or renewing the war but at preserving and strengthening peace. While NHAN DAN accused the President of "slander and intimidation," it ignored his specific charges that North Vietnam had not fully cooperated in efforts to account for U.S. servicemen missing in action, had poured huge amounts of military equipment into South Vietnam, and had refused to withdraw its troops from Laos and Cambodia.

At variance with NHAN DAN's failure to mention the President's remarks on U.S.-Soviet relations, a Liberation Radio commentary noted that he "called upon the American people to continue giving him the necessary support to negotiate with the USSR" as well as with North Vietnam. Hanoi media have acknowledged Brezhnev's planned visit to the United States next month, however. A Hanoi radio review of the DRV press on 16 May indicated that NHAN DAN had published a report on the visit. No other Hanoi reference to the visit has been monitored and the papers for the 16th are not yet available. Hanoi's acknowledgment of the visit is consistent with its posture since the conclusion of the Paris agreement, a posture in sharp contrast to that during the Big Power summitry last year. Vietnamese communist media studiously avoided explicit mention of the President's visits to Peking and Moscow, although they made their displeasure clear and even pointedly derided, without identifying, statements by the President during those trips.

PRG, DRV DECRY GVN PRISONER POLICY, NOTE ON NORTH-SOUTH TALKS

Vietnamese communist media on 17 May launched an attack on Saigon's 14 May note to Hanoi proposing that their two governments immediately hold consultations in accordance with Article 15C of the Paris agreement. This article calls for negotiations between the North and South to reestablish normal relations in various fields and to discuss such questions as the modalities of civilian movement across the DMZ. Liberation Radio broadcasts on the 17th vehemently charged that Saigon had no right to make such a proposal and that Thieu is endeavoring to assume the title of the sole legal and constitutional representative in the South and to refute the legal existence of the PRG and deny the existence of the "third political force." Maintaining that the accord must be "implemented comprehensively," the broadcasts asserted that the reunification of Vietnam mentioned in Article 15 of Chapter 5 can only be achieved after the first four chapters and all their articles are

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"respected and seriously implemented." Thus, in the PRG's view, negotiations with the North would have to be delayed until after the formation of a new government in the South as provided for in Chapter 4. Saigon's proposal was also criticized in articles in NHAN DAN on the 17th and in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 18th.

POLICY ON PRISONERS Saigon press reports that prominent opposition leaders in GVN custody will be turned over to the communists have prompted denunciations in both DRV and PRG comment. The 18 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, for example, charged that such a move would be aimed at severing the relationship between these leaders and mass organizations. Liberation Radio's 21 May account of the weekly press conference by the PRG's delegation to the JMC reported that the PRG spokesman, in response to a question, rejected the Saigon charge that Mrs. Ngo Ba Thanh, lawyer Nguyen Long, student Huynh Tan Mam, and others "worked for the communists" and therefore will be returned to the PRG. Judging by the radio's account, the spokesman made no reference to former GVN National Assembly Deputy Tran Ngoc Chau whose possible release to the PRG had been the subject of Western press speculation.

The spokesman's opening statement to the 19 May press gathering recalled that four days earlier the head of the PRG delegation,* in a statement at a JMC session, had pledged the PRG would respect the aspirations of "patriots" who "do not side with any party" and "allow them to return to their respective mass organizations and families in whatever area." Such a policy had been indicated earlier in a 12 May VNA account of a GVN release of civilian prisoners in Quang Tri on the previous day. VNA noted that among those released, 28 asked to return to their native places and "the PRG complied with their request and urged the Saigon side to take them to their native places and ensure their safety."

* The PRG delegation is now headed by Maj. Gen. Hoang An Tuan whose assignment to the position was announced in a 12 May note. Tuan replaced Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra who had gone to Hanoi on 30 March for a three-week visit. Tra was reported by Liberation Radio to have subsequently visited military units in Quang Tri on 28 April, but his activities since then have not been revealed in the media.

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SIHANOUK CALLS ON U.S. TO NEGOTIATE WITH HIS GOVERNMENT

Against the background of the Kissinger-Tho consultations in Paris, Sihanouk has been stressing during his current tour abroad that a peace settlement in Cambodia will be reached only when the United States agrees to negotiate directly with his government (RGNU) for the purpose of ending U.S. involvement in Cambodia. Sihanouk has underlined his government's role as the exclusive negotiating agent for a Cambodian settlement with Washington by claiming that Le Duc Tho has informed the United States that it must contact the RGNU in order to settle Cambodian matters. The prince has held out the prospect of an immediate reconciliation including the resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States, but he has conditioned this with demands for an end of U.S. bombing and military support of the Lon Nol government.

In a speech during a reception held in his honor in Mali on 18 May and reported by NCNA, Sihanouk noted that "at present there is much talk in the world about the necessity of realizing peace in Cambodia." It was in this context that he stressed that to bring about a settlement the United States "must directly address itself to the RGNU led by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, failing which the American-Cambodian problem will not be solved." He said his regime wishes to effect "an immediate official reconciliation" with the United States that would be "consecrated by the immediate reestablishing of diplomatic relations," but added that this would be achieved only when the United States ends its "air intervention" and military aid for Lon Nol and withdraws all foreign military personnel.

Also on 18 May Sihanouk at a press conference, broadcast live by the Mali radio, cited the Kissinger-Tho talks in stressing that "our brother Le Duc Tho has already told Kissinger that North Vietnam does not wish to see the Cambodian question on the agenda of the U.S.-North Vietnam talks, because the Cambodian question is the responsibility of Cambodian sovereignty." According to Sihanouk, Tho told Kissinger to inform President Nixon that the only way to settle the problem is for Washington to contact Sihanouk and his government. Neither NCNA nor the FUNK media carried the interview.

Other Sihanouk remarks have stressed the RGNU's continued firm stand against a compromise involving an accommodation with the Lon Nol regime. In a 19 May banquet speech in the Congo that

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was reported by NCNA, Sihanouk reiterated the insurgents' resolve to continue the armed struggle until "U.S. imperialism" is driven out and "the clique of the traitor Lon Nol and his associates Sirik Matak, In Tam, Cheng Heng, and Son Ngoc Thanh are all eliminated." Earlier, a RGNU "open letter" of 16 May appealing for world support against U.S. bombing and backing for Lon Nol--signed by the three Cambodian in-country insurgent leaders along with various mass organizations--seemed to reflect concern over alleged U.S. diplomatic efforts to isolate the Cambodian resistance from international support. The letter devoted special attention to criticizing the Nixon Administration's "political and diplomatic maneuvers to lure to their side as many partners as possible in the international arena in the same manner as the Munich conference" as a means of isolating the Cambodian resistance and allowing the United States to annihilate the insurgents at will. The letter made no mention of any future conference or international agreement on Cambodia and expressed firm confidence that world opinion will side with the insurgents against the United States.

FOREIGN SUPPORT There has thus far been no monitored foreign comment in response to the letter's appeal, but a RGNU Foreign Ministry statement dated 12 May (released on the 15th) condemning U.S. bombing and other military support for the Phnom Penh government since February of this year was seconded by foreign ministry statements of the DRV and the PRG on 19 May. The DRV protest predictably connected U.S. actions in Cambodia with "serious and systematic" U.S. violations of the Paris and Vientiane accords and charged that the United States seeks to impose neocolonialism in Cambodia and is directly threatening peace in Indochina. While promising that the Vietnamese will "support wholeheartedly" the Cambodian struggle, the statement sidestepped a direct endorsement of Sihanouk's March 1970 five-point declaration--which was invoked in the RGNU statement--by asserting that the Vietnamese are "firmly convinced" that the Cambodians will achieve the goals set forth in the five points.

Peking has sustained its low posture, offering no supporting comment while restricting coverage largely to replays of carefully sanitized versions of its Indochinese allies' statements. Thus the NCNA version of the 19 May DRV statement on Cambodia deleted criticism of U.S. intentions, charges of violations of the Paris and Vientiane agreements, and the

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assertion that Washington is threatening the Indochina peace. More notably, Peking's account of Le Duc Tho's 15 May statement on arrival in Paris omitted his initial remarks warning that resumed U.S. bombing of PRG-held areas would scuttle the Paris talks and charging that the United States was putting pressure on the DRV prior to the talks and directly menacing peace in South Vietnam. Also demonstrating its discreet approach Peking's commemoration of Mao's 20 May 1970 statement calling for an anti-U.S. international united front in reaction to the incursion into Cambodia was even more muffled than last year's sparse observance. In the only comment on the anniversary, a low-level PEOPLE'S DAILY article by the vice president of the Peking Trade Union Council was devoted mainly to a portrayal of growing world resistance to domination by the superpowers while only briefly hailing the Paris and Vientiane agreements and the struggle against "the traitorous Lon Nol clique."

PATHET LAO RADIO INITIATES COMMENT ON VIENTIANE NEGOTIATIONS

Since the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) announced in a communique on 12 May that more publicity would be given to LPF positions in the protracted negotiations with the Royal Lao Government (RLG), the Pathet Lao radio has begun discussing aspects of the talks not mentioned previously.* Details of the efforts to form a provisional coalition government in conformity with the stipulations of the agreement signed by the two sides on 21 February had been virtually ignored in Pathet Lao media since the talks were initiated almost three months ago. But now in four commentaries broadcast between 17 and 20 May the LPF has outlined its views on the possible creation of a deputy premier's position, the distribution of ministerial posts, the functions of the proposed "National Political Coalition Council," and the neutralization of Luang Prabang and Vientiane.

Simultaneously with the broadcast of the first commentary providing some substantive details, the media announced that on 17 May two of the three deputy heads of the LPF delegation left for Sam Neua "to report on the state of the negotiations." During a two-day stopover in Hanoi, the delegates were received by a DRV vice foreign minister.

* The LPF communique is discussed in the TRENDS of 16 May 1973, pages 12-14.

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The negotiating positions outlined in the radio commentaries can be summarized as follows:

+ A deputy premier's post should be created and filled by an LPF appointee, under the assumption that RLG Premier Souvanna Phouma will retain his present position in the coalition government. The RLG's refusal to approve this move and its earlier offer to create two deputy premier posts, one for each side, are attempts by the RLG to obtain "a majority vote on every issue" and to furnish an opportunity "to make changes that it desires in the government." (The 21 February agreement does not mention a deputy premier.)

+ The Economy and Planning Ministry should not be divided into two ministries, and the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Religious Affairs should not be merged. The proposal of the RLG to divide the Economy and Planning Ministry constitutes an effort to retain control of foreign aid disbursements in an economy ministry that would permit RLG supporters to "pocket" the aid as they have in the past. The "depraved" proposal by the RGL to merge the justice and religious affairs ministries is an example of the RLG's disrespect for the national religion and a move that has aroused the displeasure of "all Buddhist novices and bonzes." The RLG's contention that the LPF disregards religious practices is part of a "sinister scheme" to slander the LPF. The RLG wants to control most of the important ministries and leave the insignificant ministries to the LPF.

+ The proposed "National Political Coalition Council" should be authorized "to discuss or give advice on making laws" and the duration of its existence should be determined by the two sides with the approval of the king. The RLG view that the council will not play a role in the law-making process "is contrary" to the 21 February agreement. In addition, the RLG claim that the term of the council must not exceed the present term of the "so-called" RLG seventh National Assembly--which expires in 1977--also violates the provisions of the agreement. (The February agreement lists the duties of the coalition council as discussing major domestic and international questions with the provisional government, promoting the implementation of the agreement, and participating in the organization of the elections; however, no timetable is provided.)

+ The neutralization of Luang Prabang and Vientiane should be accomplished by permitting the two sides to maintain police forces

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of equal size in the two cities to insure the security of the members of the coalition government and other bodies established under the agreement. The RLG "must completely withdraw all of its military forces, weapons and war supplies, and spy organizations from the two cities, and relocate them in areas distant from the two cities." The RLG has taken the "obdurate and depraved stand" that its military and police forces will continue to control the cities. As a result, the coalition government "will be intimidated and threatened by the Vientiane side's reactionary forces."

Recently Moscow has begun to supply significant reportage on points related to the talks that have not been discussed by Pathet Lao media.* A Moscow radio commentary by Valeriy Petrov broadcast only in Lao on 19 May discussed aspects of the negotiations publicized by the LPF but also made unique references to other suggestions allegedly advanced by LPF chief negotiator Phoumi Vongvichit, who is the secretary general of the LPF, in "a new eight-point" proposal. According to Petrov, the LPF recommended that the coalition council have 42 members, comprising 15 representatives from each side in the discussions and 12 "representatives of the forces that advocate independence and peace." Petrov also asserted without elaboration that the LPF proposed "the withdrawal of U.S. military advisers and Thai mercenaries from Laos in three phases and the exchange of POW's in installments." Petrov commented that these proposals again proved that "the LPF always takes the initiative in solving the Laos question."

HO CHI MINH BIRTHDAY OCCASIONS NO COMMEMORATIVE MEETING

Neither Hanoi nor the PRG/NFLSV held a commemorative meeting to mark the 19 May anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth; however the 83d anniversary did occasion the usual editorial comment, and Hanoi and Liberation Radio during the days before and after the 19th opened newscasts with quotations from Ho and broadcast material about him. The absence of any commemorative meeting in Hanoi may simply be the continuation of a move, suggested in changes in ceremonies last year, to reduce the level of festivities

* A Moscow radio broadcast in Lao last week revealed that LPF delegation head Phoun Sipraseuth had stated at a press conference that a formal Indochina front comprising Lao, Vietnamese and Cambodian "patriotic forces" did not exist; see the TRENDS of 16 May, pp. 13-14.

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on the anniversary: In the first two years after Ho's death in September 1969, Hanoi marked his birth anniversary with meetings attended by most of the Politburo and jointly sponsored by the party Central Committee, the National Assembly Standing Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Vietnam Fatherland Front. This practice was abandoned in 1972; however the absence of such a high-level gathering was not surprising in view of the renewal of U.S. air strikes throughout the DRV in early May last year. In addition, the Fatherland Front Central Committee convened a conference on 20 May 1972--attended by Truong Chinh and other lower-level officials--which NHAN DAN noted came at the time of the Ho anniversary.

The PRG and the NFLSV, until this year, had marked the Ho anniversary after his death with jointly sponsored meetings attended by high-level officials. This year Liberation Radio noted one low-level regional meeting on the occasion, but reported no central-level functions. As usual NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat sent an anniversary message of congratulations to the DRV leaders.

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U. S. - U S S R

MOSCOW OFFERS RATIONALE FOR EXPANDED COOPERATION WITH WEST

Since the April CPSU Central Committee plenum, which provided an impressive show of support for Brezhnev's detente policy, Moscow has offered a detailed public rationale for a policy of increased long-term cooperation with the West in a variety of fields. Although the outlines of that policy had become increasingly clear before the plenum, recent articles in the central press by prominent Soviet commentators have clarified some of the ambiguities in the official rationale. In a frank public rejection of autarky, the articles have argued that no nation, however highly developed, can in isolation insure the necessary progress in all social and economic sectors. Brezhnev himself was forthcoming on this issue during his recent trip to the FRG, where he categorically declared on West German television on 21 May that Soviet domestic economic plans "are by no means plans designed for autarky." The ideological justification for a policy of extensive cooperation with the West has taken the form of pointed reminders that such a course was pursued by the founders of the Soviet state.

Trade and economic ties are clearly the main underpinnings of global cooperation in Moscow's view. The theoretical justification for expanded economic cooperation with Western capitalist countries was provided by USSR Gosplan member V. Spandaryan in the 8 May PRAVDA and by N. N. Inozemtsev, head of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economy and International Relations, in PRAVDA of the 16th. While reiterating the notion that international relations will benefit from increased East-West trade, Spandaryan and Inozemtsev pulled no punches in citing the advantages that would accrue to the Soviet economy. Inozemtsev, in particular, noted that in addition to profiting from specialization on an international scale and from more rapid development in a number of economic fields and geographic regions, the USSR would be able to direct the resulting inflow of foreign capital and technology toward raising the Soviet standard of living more rapidly.

A more specific case for increased cooperation with the United States was made by Inozemtsev, USA Institute head Arbatov, and deputy foreign trade minister Alkhimov--participants in a Washington conference on bilateral trade earlier this year and

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co-authors of a two part article in IZVESTIYA on 5 and 8 May-- and by PRAVDA's Yuriy Zhukov on the 15th. These articles emphasized that economic cooperation with the United States and the West had precedents dating back to Lenin's day. In an apparent warning to domestic critics, Zhukov recalled Lenin's threat to punish government officials resisting the policy of economic cooperation.

The recent articles also reflected Moscow's traditional caution in treating economic cooperation with the United States as compared with cooperation with other Western nations. The difference in emphasis may be explained by Moscow's continued uncertainty about long-range U.S. attitudes toward bilateral cooperation and its desire to make clear that, in embarking on a course of expanded cooperation with the world's leading capitalist power, the USSR is not sacrificing its vital interests or bowing to exigencies of domestic economic problems. The IZVESTIYA series and the Zhukov article both stressed that any further expansion of cooperation must be based on equality, and both sounded a contingent note in suggesting that the test of U.S. attitudes would be provided by the manner in which recent agreements were implemented. Unlike the Spandaryan and Inozemtsev articles, the IZVESTIYA series focused on certain "objective" factors compelling the United States to choose the path of cooperation with socialist countries. In comparison with commentaries that stressed the bright prospects for U.S.-Soviet trade in the weeks before the April plenum, the IZVESTIYA series struck a more contingent note by appearing less impatient for substantial trade increases, demanding strict equality, and acknowledging the obstacles.

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G D R - Y U G O S L A V I A

BIJEDIC VISIT PROMOTES INTERSTATE RELATIONS

The 15-18 May "official friendly" visit to East Berlin by Yugoslav Premier Dzemal Bijedic was the highest-level Yugoslav visit to the GDR since Tito's trip in June 1965. The last top-ranking East German leader to visit Yugoslavia was Ulbricht, who spent a two-week "vacation" there in June 1967 which Belgrade said was at the invitation of Tito. The 18 May communique on Bijedic's visit reported that GDR Premier Stoph had accepted an invitation for a return visit with the date to be set "through diplomatic channels."

The communique, which concentrated on bilateral interstate relations, characterized the atmosphere of the visit as "cordial and friendly" and noted that the talks between the two premiers had been marked by "frankness" as well. It applauded the "positive" development of the two countries' relations, "particularly in the economic sphere," and noted the increase in lower level bilateral contacts during the past year. Opening the way for a further thaw, the document said the two premiers agreed on the value of high-level "personal contacts" and the need for "fresh initiatives" in bilateral relations and expressed the two countries' readiness for "a long-term and stable development" of their economic relations.

The persistence of differences between the two countries in domestic and foreign policy was acknowledged in the communique, but such differences were said to represent "no hindrance in the development of lasting and stable cooperation in spheres of mutual interest." As a concession to Belgrade, the communique recorded agreement that bilateral relations must be based on "mutual respect, understanding, sovereignty, equality, noninterference, and mutual benefit." These very same principles--in interparty as well as interstate relations--had also been endorsed by PZPR leader Giersek and Tito in their joint statement issued in Belgrade on 8 May.

Apart from a brief reference to a "friendly" talk between Bijedic and SED First Secretary Honecker, the communique did not discuss interparty relations. However, the Yugoslav premier went out of his way to recall, in a Belgrade airport interview on the 18th, that he had "also had a very, very friendly and exhaustive talk

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with Comrade Erich Honecker" and other members of the SED Central Committee during his stay. On the East German side, a Raabe commentary carried by the East Berlin domestic service the same day stressed that, despite differences, the existence of a "common" ground was reflected in Belgrade's consistent adherence to "certain basic socialist principles" such as "the leading role of the LCY" and--in a clear reference to the current Yugoslav purge--"the repulse of bourgeois influences."

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U S S R

BREZHNEV CULT BURGEONS IN WAKE OF APRIL CPSU PLENUM

In the wake of the April CPSU Central Committee plenum, there has been a sharp upsurge in publicity for Brezhnev in connection with his receipt of the Lenin Peace Prize and his trips to Poland, the GDR, and FRG.* Brezhnev has received unprecedented praise for his political accomplishments, especially in foreign affairs, and his preeminent role in the leadership has gained public recognition. For example, the Fourth Congress of Artists, which opened in Moscow on 15 May, bestowed the controversial title of "head" of the Politburo on Brezhnev. At the same time, Brezhnev has continued to occupy first place in the public listings of Politburo members--out of the standard alphabetical order.

Brezhnev has been showered with praise by members of the Politburo as well as by representatives of various domestic organizations. Shelepin made a special point of noting Brezhnev's "huge personal contribution" to peace at a May Day dinner for visiting foreign trade union leaders, and Grechko followed suit in a 9 May PRAVDA article. At a 14 May meeting of the Komsomol bureau, Komsomol First Secretary Tyazhelnikov applauded the award of the Lenin Prize to the "unwavering revolutionary Leninist, outstanding figure of the international communist and workers movement, ardent internationalist, and passionate champion of peace and friendship between peoples, comrade L.I. Brezhnev."

The display of adulation for the party leader was typified by the letter to Brezhnev from the Moscow city aktiv following its 15 May meeting. The letter declared that Brezhnev occupied "the leading role in working out and implementing the foreign policy course of our party." The 16 May SOVIET RUSSIA likewise quoted the Kursk aktiv's letter to Brezhnev as declaring "your activity in the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee is a brilliant and convincing example of internationalism in work, faithfulness to the ideals of class solidarity, and of persistent struggle for the interests of the working masses and all progressive mankind."

* For an analysis of the April plenum and its immediate aftermath, see the TRENDS of 2 May 1973, pages 1-2.

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UKRAINIAN, BELORUSSIAN PHOTOGRAPHS REFLECT POLITBURO SHIFTS

The first lineups of portraits of the new Politburo---appearing in the 2 May Ukrainian and Belorussian papers---illustrate Polyanskiy's precipitous fall and cast light on the positions of the three new members. RADYANSKA UKRAINA's photo of the Ukrainian May Day portrait lineup shows that agriculture Secretary Kulakov has replaced fellow agriculturalist Polyanskiy in the ninth position. Polyanskiy and Shelepin, who continues in disfavor despite his flattery of Brezhnev, are now placed below the three new Politburo members. Of the latter, Andropov is clearly favored over Gromyko and Grechko in the Ukraine. Comparison of recent Ukrainian portrait rankings shows that remarkably few changes have occurred in the past year despite Shcherbitskiy's replacement of Shelest as Ukrainian leader. Only Grishin, Polyanskiy, Kulakov, and Shcherbitskiy have been noticeably affected:

MAY DAY 1973

1. Brezhnev
2. Kosygin
3. Podgornyy
4. Kirilenko
5. Suslov
6. Shcherbitskiy
7. Mazurov
8. Grishin
9. Kulakov
10. Pelshe
11. Andropov
12. Kunayev
13. Gromyko
14. Grechko
15. Polyanskiy
16. Shelepin

7 NOVEMBER 1972

1. Brezhnev
2. Kosygin
3. Podgornyy
4. Kirilenko
5. Suslov
6. Shcherbitskiy
7. Mazurov
8. Grishin
9. Polyanskiy
10. Pelshe
11. Kulakov
12. Kunayev
13. Voronov
14. Shelepin
15. Shelest

MAY DAY 1972

1. Brezhnev
2. Kosygin
3. Podgornyy
4. Kirilenko
5. Suslov
6. Mazurov
7. Shelest
8. Pelshe
9. Polyanskiy
10. Shcherbitskiy
11. Kulakov
12. Kunayev
13. Voronov
14. Shelepin
15. Grishin

The Belorussian May Day portrait lineup showed an even sharper fall for Polyanskiy--from fifth to thirtieth place. He had been ranked fifth in Belorussia since 1971. In contrast to the

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Ukraine, Belorussia ranked native-son Gromyko exceptionally high. Belorussian papers customarily include only one side of the portrait lineup in their photos of the May Day parade:

MAY DAY 1973

1. Brezhnev
3. Podgorny
5. Kirilenko
7. Gromyko
9. Andropov
11. Pelshe
13. Polyanskiy
15. Shelepin

7 NOVEMBER 1972

1. Brezhnev
3. Podgorny
5. Polyanskiy
7. Kirilenko
9. Kulakov
11. Pelshe
13. Shelest

Procedures varied in other republics. Some papers had only portraits of the Politburo troika, others showed no portraits on their reviewing stands, while others did not carry photos of the reviewing stand.

JOURNAL DEFENDS RIGHTS OF REPUBLICS AGAINST CENTRAL PLANNERS

Proposals to exclude republic officials from the formulation of long-range economic plans have been condemned in the May issue of the Gosplan journal PLANNED ECONOMY. In upholding the rights of republics in economic planning and advocating the maintenance of a balance between territorial and central planning, an editorial in the journal ran directly counter to the prevailing trend toward centralization embodied in the recent attacks on economic nationalism and the recent proposals to revise republic borders in the interest of economic efficiency.* The appearance of the editorial is the more notable given Brezhnev's seeming encouragement of the trend toward centralization in his speech last December on the occasion of the USSR's 50th anniversary.

The controversy over this matter appears to have arisen in connection with the preparation of long-range plans for 1976-1990. Similar friction between central and local officials appears to have emerged over the implementation of the recent Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree calling for the creation of national and territorial production associations to manage

* For background, see the TRENDS of 10 January 1973, pages 13-14.

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Industry. For example, Sverdlovsk First Secretary Ya. P. Ryabov in a 25 April SOVIET RUSSIA article proposed that the headquarters of several national production associations be established in Sverdlovsk and warned that "it would be incorrect to locate them only in Moscow."

The editorial in PLANNED ECONOMY revealed that "some officials of union ministries" were proposing to cease breaking down draft plans by region for submission to republic councils of ministers and instead to forward general lists of indicators of already approved enterprise plans to the republics. The editorial charged that such proposals were motivated by a desire "to avoid discussion" of draft plans with republic leaders and that they reflected "the departmental narrowmindedness of some officials of ministries." Republics were already being by-passed in the planning process, the editorial complained, because all-union ministries habitually delayed the delivery of draft plans to republics, with the result that "local agencies do not have enough time for compilation work and preparation of proposals." The editorial urged republics to counter this practice by endeavoring to collect plan data at the local level before it is transmitted to Moscow and returned to the republics in the form of draft plans.

The dispute over the role of republics in the economy appears to be related to current preparations of a long-range plan for 1976-1990. In connection with these preparations, Gosplan recently reorganized the network of economic regions into seven enlarged regions and formed a Council for Study of Production Forces to investigate and report on the resources of the USSR, the union republics and the enlarged economic regions. According to Gosplan official V. Pavlenko in the May PLANNED ECONOMY, work on the long-range plan has entered the stage of determining the location of production forces and the basic orientation of the union republics; the next stage of actually compiling the plan will begin in the second half of this year. The PLANNED ECONOMY editorial, in discussing the problem of determining the locations of new industrial regions and economic complexes in the long-range plan, declared that "it is clear that this work can be successfully carried out only with the active participation of the leading and planning organs of the union republics."

Another article in the same issue of PLANNED ECONOMY, by RSFSR Gosplan official N. Zenchenko, likewise spelled out the responsibilities of republics in economic planning. The article indicated that the

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September 1965 CPSU plenum had authorized republic councils of ministers to review Moscow's draft plans and to submit their own proposals. And it cited a 1967 government decree directing enterprises to submit their draft plans simultaneously to local and central planning agencies. "Experience," Zenchenko declared, "has shown the correctness of these measures."

NOTE

CHINA RELIGIOUS BUREAU: In the wake of Teng Hsiao-ping's resurrection last month and his return to active duty as one of Chou En-lai's vice premiers, Peking has taken yet another step toward reconstituting offices that fell victim to the cultural revolution. NCNA on 14 May and again on the 16th announced that Hsiao Hsien-fa, identified as "a leading member" of the Bureau of Religious Affairs, had meetings with a visiting Japanese religious delegation in Peking. Hsiao, the former director of the bureau, had not appeared publicly since 1966, and the Religious Affairs Bureau--an agency under Chou's State Council--had not been mentioned in the official media since then. The reactivation of this office is another sign of the return to precultural revolution norms under Chou's aegis.